3 demonstrated that merely choosing to use a mug was not sufficient to elicit rightward drift or acceleration effects. We suggest that these findings reflect separate and distinct mechanisms associated with socially related visuomotor processing.
Introduction
Ownership is fundamental in conceptual, practical, and legal terms to human society. In modern society, the concept of ownership contributes to social functioning between individuals. When we interact with our own and other people's property on a daily basis, it is important to abide by our society's social and legal contracts to avoid conflict. Is it possible that such socially relevant constructs become embodied within our motor system? The purpose of the present research is to examine how the attribution of social meaning manifests in human kinematic patterns. The following experiments are specifically designed to be sensitive to differences in the kinematics associated with differing ownership status. We manipulate the social context the participant experiences to reveal the cognitive mechanisms that underpin social cognitive processes associated with personal property.
What is mine is mine and what is yours is yours: cognitive processing of self-and other-owned objects Generally speaking, we like what we own more than that which we do not (e.g. mere-ownership effect, Beggan 1992) . Humans also show enhanced awareness and
Abstract
Understanding who owns what is important for guiding appropriate action in a social context. Previously, we demonstrated that ownership influences our kinematic patterns associated with hand-object interactions (Constable et al. in Cognition 119(3):430-437, 2011) . Here, we present a series of experiments aimed at determining the underlying mechanisms associated with this effect. We asked participants to lift mugs that differed in terms of ownership status (Experiments 1 and 2) and personal preference (Experiment 3) while recording spatial and acceleration measures. In Experiment 1, participants lifted their own mug with greater acceleration and drew it closer to themselves than they did the experimenter's mug. They also lifted the experimenter's mug further to the right compared with other mugs. In Experiment 2, spatial trajectory effects were preserved, but the acceleration effect abolished, when the owner of the 'other-owned' mug was a known-but absent-confederate. Experiment more robust processing of what is theirs (Cunningham et al. , 2011 Kim and Johnson 2012; Turk et al. 2013 Turk et al. , 2011a van den Bos et al. 2010) and attention biases towards self-related stimuli (Alexopoulos et al. 2012; Turk et al. 2011b ). For example, Cunningham et al. (2008) show that temporary ownership elicits a memory advantage. They gave participants a set of cards to separate into two baskets. One basket was designated their own, and one was designated as another participant's. The cards placed in the participant's 'own' basket were recognised more frequently than those placed in the other participant's basket. Using a similar task, Turk et al. (2011b) also demonstrated a narrowing of attention towards self-owned items. Overall, these processing and attentional biases suggest that the cognitive system prioritises the representation of selfowned items.
There is a wealth of research focusing on 'what I own', but there is still relatively little research that investigates how other people's property is represented. There are clear heuristics that adults use when determining ownership status (Beggan and Brown 1994; Kanngiesser and Hood 2014; Merrill 1998; Palamar et al. 2012) , so can we use cognitive measures to observe the nuanced aspects of how individuals identify, process, reason about, and interact with other people's property? Indeed, the finding that other-owned objects are not cognitively represented the same way as self-owned objects in terms of motor affordances (Constable et al. 2011; Turk et al. 2011a ) is a first step towards answering these questions.
An embodied social cognitive approach to studying object ownership According to the theories of embodied cognition, cognitive processes such as thought cannot be clearly separated from perception and action (e.g. Anderson et al. 2012; Borghi 2005; Niedenthal et al. 2005) . For example, if participants are required to say the word 'climbing' as compared to 'sinking', while performing a reach, greater perturbation along the vertical plane is observed (Kritikos et al. 2012) . We propose that the principles of embodied cognition can also apply to less tangible and predictable concepts such as ownership. Indeed, according to Borghi and Cimatti (2010) representing objects in terms of their contextual properties when dealing with complex action situations may be useful rather than simply attending to their lower level perceptual qualities, such as shape and weight.
Kinematic research reveals the automaticity with which we incorporate concepts associated with social context into our own action planning and representations. For example, cooperative and competitive intentions are reflected in different motor patterns (Georgiou et al. 2007 ) and a participant's kinematics are sensitive to another person's attitude within these contexts (Becchio et al. 2008) . A request for an object can alter kinematic patterns: when participants are in the process of transferring an object to a container and a confederate holds out their hand, the movement tends to deviate towards the hand. In some cases, participants ignore their goal altogether and place the object in the confederate's hand (Sartori et al. 2009 ).
Further, the attribution of meaning can change the way we respond and interact with stimuli. The intrinsic affective valence associated with an object alters our perception of reachable space (Valdés-Conroy et al. 2012) , and valenced stimuli such as 'kiss' or 'funeral' elicit an approach or avoidance effects in reaction time (Chen and Bargh 1999; Markman and Brendl 2005; van Dantzig et al. 2008 ). This notion has been extended recently using positively or negatively construed inanimate objects and socially relevant contextual indicators (Lugli et al. 2012) . Similarly, individual spontaneous interactions with stimuli influence their subsequent evaluation (Constable et al. 2013) .
We have previously shown that the attribution of ownership status to an object influences adult's hand-object interactions (Constable et al. 2011) . We asked participants to lift mugs that differed on the basis of ownership: a mug they owned, a mug owned by the experimenter, or a mug without a designated owner. Participants' kinematic patterns were consistent with an inhibition of action towards other-owned objects: participants bring their own objects closer to the body, push objects owned by a known, present other away from the body while treating them more carefully (less acceleration).
Broadly, we propose that participants' attribution of socially relevant semantic information to each mug directly influences visuomotor processing. In fact, the effects on different kinematic measures may be associated with specific aspects of the social cognitive construct of ownership and reflect separate and distinct processes. Further investigation is needed, however, to determine the distinct social cognitive mechanisms underlying these kinematic differences.
The present study
We aimed to replicate the kinematic results obtained by Constable et al. (2011) in order to confirm that the influence of ownership status on action execution is indeed robust as well as establish the boundary conditions of these effects. Experiment 1 was a direct replication of our previous study, with one additional manipulation. In Constable et al. (2011) , we found that people drew their own mug closer to their own body, and with greater acceleration, while lifting it from the table. We also found-in accordance with our proposition that the ownership status of other people's property is coded in our motoric interactionsthat the experimenter's mug drifted further to the right than the participant's mug. First, we aim to arbitrate between two possible explanations of this effect. One explanation is that the ownership status of the object ('Owned by someone else') led the participants to exaggerate the natural trajectory of a right-handed lifting action which moves away from one's own body. The second explanation relates to the fact that the experimenter was seated to the right of the workspace. Combined with the observation that participants drew their mugs towards themselves, and the experimenter's mug drifted towards the experimenter, we might conclude that the kinematics of the lifting action are biased spatially towards the mug's owner. Therefore, we manipulated between subjects where the experimenter stood ('experimenter location': to the left or the right). If the participant acts so as to take the experimenter's mug away from the self, the experimenter's mug will drift further to the right irrespective of experimenter location. The alternative explanation would be supported if experimenter location influences deviation as a function of ownership status.
After broadly replicating the findings of Constable et al. (2011) in Experiment 1, we explored the influence of owner presence in Experiment 2 by removing the owner from the environment entirely. There are a wide variety of effects demonstrating that the mere presence of another person can alter behaviour (e.g. the bystander effect, Fischer et al. 2011; social facilitation, Snyder et al. 2012; social inhibition, Bell and Yee 1989) . In the present research, is the presence of the owner critical for the emergence of the differential motor effects on our critical spatial and acceleration measures found in Experiment 1? It may be that these subtle effects are a behavioural manifestation of a desire to smooth and maintain personal relationships. Perhaps, the standard motor codes associated with other people's property are not triggered when the social context of ownership is no longer salient or important. If this is the case, the differences in the dynamic manipulation between the mugs will not be as robust.
Finally, Experiment 3 was conducted to determine whether the ownership effects obtained in Experiments 1 and 2 could be explained simply in terms of mere preference and choice, which are frequently confounded with ownership (see the mere-ownership effect, Beggan 1992). Rather than inducing ownership over mugs, participants were asked to choose a mug to use during the experiment. The experimenter also chose a mug. Importantly, neither the participant nor the experimenter owned the mugs used in this experiment. As such, we predicted that the participant's and experimenter's chosen mugs would be manipulated in the same way. If, however, the effects reported in Experiments 1 and 2 can be elicited even in this minimal personally relevant experimental context, then it would be difficult to credit them as ownership effects. To pre-empt the findings, aside from drawing one's chosen mug towards oneself, Experiment 3 did not reveal any influence of mug choice on kinematics.
Across the three experiments, we show that (a) the pattern of lift trajectories is stable when comparing mugs with differing ownership status, regardless of the location of the owner, (b) the acceleration effects associated with ownership seem to rely on the presence of the owner, and (c) the drift towards the participant's body may be associated with preference rather than ownership directly. Broadly speaking, these three experiments provide further evidence that ownership influences visuomotor processing and performance. Only two of the previously found ownership effects (rightward drift and acceleration), however, are dissociable effects specifically associated with ownership. The results are largely consistent with the notion that the link between perception and action is socially mediated: socially related variables can be embodied within the motor system and influence object-oriented actions as a function of the social information regarding that object.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 was a replication of Constable et al. (2011, Experiment 1) , except that the experimenter's location relative to the workspace was manipulated between subjects in order to explore the influence of spatial-social context in this paradigm. We used motion capture to record participants' natural lifts with three different mugs (their own, the experimenter's, and one without a designated owner). We predicted that the pattern of data shown by Constable et al. (2011) would be reproduced. Specifically, that the experimenter's mug would drift to the right further than the other two mugs; the participant's mug would deviate further towards the participant's body and achieve greater acceleration and greater deceleration than the other two mugs.
Method

Participants
Forty-nine naive right-handed individuals took part in the experiment (mean age = 20.67 years, SD = 4.29 years; 10 were male) in exchange for partial course credit or AU$30.
Materials and apparatus
Fifty-one white ceramic mugs (height = 10 cm, diameter of base = 6 cm) were used in the experiment. Each participant was given a mug and instructed to paint a design of their choosing with any of eighteen colours provided. During the experiment, two other mugs were used; the experimenter's, which was also painted, and a blank 1 3 mug without an explicitly defined owner (see Fig. 1a for examples). Lifts were recorded in Cartesian coordinate space (x = left-right; y = forward-back; z = up-down) using three spherical reflective markers (12 mm diameter) attached to each mug and a three camera infrared motion capture system (ProReflex, Qualisys; 100-Hz sample rate, measurement error <0.3 mm). Four markers were also attached to the participant's hand (index finger and thumb) and wrist (styloid process of the radius and ulna).
Design and Procedure
After the participant's painted mug dried, they used the mug for an average of 12.83 days (SD = 3.77) prior to the experimental session. Self-reported usage rates averaged 1.57 times per day (SD = 1.18, min = 0.36, max = 6.11). The participant was seated in front of a table and told that their movements (reach, grasp, lift, replace) with each of the three mugs would be recorded. The experimenter introduced the three mugs by stating that the participant should make the action towards whichever mug was on the table at the time and that this might be their own mug, 'my mug' (the experimenter's), or 'this unpainted mug'. Participants were then asked to make a practice reach, grasp, lift, and replace action using only the handle to ensure they understood their task and were doing it in a natural manner. Each trial began with the participant closing their eyes, and their hand resting comfortably in front of them at a marked location with their thumb and index finger gently opposing. The experimenter would then place a mug in front of the participant at one of three marked locations 30 cm away from the starting position (directly in front or 40° to the right or left, see Fig. 1b ). A tone would sound to indicate that the participant should open their eyes and initiate their movement. There were a total of 108 trials, 36 per mug (participant's, experimenter's, unowned) divided equally between the three marked locations, presented randomly. The experimenter stood within participants' peripersonal space (i.e. 30-80 cm from left/right shoulder) either to the right (n = 24) or the left (n = 25) of the table.
Data analysis
Two participants' data from the 'experimenter-on-the-left' condition were discarded prior to analysis as their means lay 3SDs above/below the group mean on multiple critical measures. Individual trials with recording errors (0.47 %) were also removed before analysis. Four measures, as previously examined by Constable et al. (2011) , were calculated using the coordinate and timing data recorded. At the maximum height reached by the mug, we took both the x-and y-coordinates to look at the displacement along these axes from the mugs' starting position (resulting in the measures 'x at z-max' and 'y at z-max'). We also examined 'peak acceleration during lift' and 'peak deceleration during placement' which refer to the maximum acceleration a mug reached from the beginning of lift until the maximum height was reached and the maximum deceleration the participant achieved from the time at which maximum height was reached until the mug was rested on the table once more. A 3 × 2 mixed-factors measures ANOVA, with 'Mug type' (participant's, experimenter's or unowned) as the within-subject factor and 'experimenter position' (right or left) as the between-subjects factor, was conducted on all four measures.
Results
As directed, participants interacted with the mugs in a natural manner. On average, participants took 707 ms (SD = 195 ms) to initiate movement towards the mug after hearing the tone. The entire action took 2054 ms (SD = 508), with the mug in flight for 1046 ms (SD = 297 ms). These measures are consistent with previously observed data (Constable et al. 2011) . Where appropriate we used a Huynh-Feldt correction.
Spatial manipulation
During the lift phase of the movement, 'x at z-max' indicated that the mugs tended to drift to the right (6.8 mm; see Fig. 2a ). This rightward drift varied as a function of 'Mug Type ', F(1.86, 83 .56) = 6.04, MSE = 7.25, p = .004, 2 ) compared with the experimenter's mug, (7,825 mm/s 2 , t(46) = 2.65, p = .01, d z = .39), and a trend for a difference with the unowned mug was observed (7,954 mm/s 2 , t(46) = 1.84, p = .07, d z = .27), see Fig. 3a . The difference between the experimenter's and unowned mugs was not significant, t(46) = .84, p = .41, d z = .12. Again, there was no main effect of 'Experimenter Position', F(2, 90) = 1.42, MSE = 4.67 × 10 7 , p = .24, η 2 p = .03. Therefore, the pattern of data is consistent with Constable et al. (2011) data, with greatest acceleration applied to the participants' own mug and least acceleration applied to the experimenter's mug.
This pattern was, however, qualified by a significant interaction between 'Mug Type' and 'Experimenter Position', F(1.56, 70.25) = 4.71, MSE = 1531496, p = .01, η 2 p = .095. When the experimenter stood to the right, participants reached a higher acceleration with their own mug (9,494 mm/s 2 ) compared to the experimenter's (8,481 mm/ s 2 , t(23) = 2.64, p = .02, d z = .54) and the unowned mug (8,294 mm/s 2 , t(23) = 3.11, p = .005, d z = .64). There was no difference between the other-owned and unowned mugs, t(23) = 1.18, p = .25, d z = .24. When the experimenter was situated to the left, no comparisons were revealed to be significant, (all ps < .08). So, although when the experimenter stood to the right of the participant, greater acceleration a Experiment 1. b Experiment 2. c Experiment 3. Error bars represent standard error of the mean for within-subject effects (Loftus and Masson 1994) 1 3 was applied to the participant's mug than to the experimenter's mug, this pattern was disrupted in the 'Experimenter-on-left' condition.
Inconsistent with Constable et al. (2011) , there was no effect of 'Mug type' on 'peak deceleration during placement', F(2, 90) < 1, MSE = 4975,866. Moreover, experimenter position did not significantly interact with ownership, F(2, 45) = 1.53, MSE = 5.3 × 10 7 , p = .22, η 2 p = .03.
Discussion
Participants drew their own mug closer towards themselves and displayed greater acceleration during lift compared to the experimenter's mug and the unowned mug. Moreover, when participants lifted the experimenter's mug, it drifted further to the right than when they lifted their own mug or the unowned mug. We also varied 'Experimenter Position' in this experiment, but this factor did not interact with 'Mug Type' on either spatial measure. Hence, it is unlikely that these effects are due to the location of the experimenter or in some way idiosyncratic to our design and experimental setup. More likely, we are observing an exaggerated rightward drift due to biomechanical factors involved in a right-handed abductive movement. When interacting with the experimenter's mug, this exaggerated repulsion from the body may be due to a reticence to interact with the experimenter's mug. However, there were some main effects of experimenter location on the spatial measures of lift trajectory. Overall, it seemed that participants in the 'Experimenter-on-theleft' condition showed less deviated lifts in general than the participants who completed the experiment when the experimenter stood to the right. This is an unexpected finding that is orthogonal to the ownership effect, but may be consistent with a bias towards one side of space that contains a distractor stimulus, such as seen in a cued line bisection task (e.g. Milner et al. 1992; Riddoch and Humphreys 1983) . In the present study, the 'distractor' may be the experimenter. Indeed, experimenter location has previously been shown to bias line bisection (Garza et al. 2008) .
With the acceleration data, the replication of our previous work was only partial. Although deceleration was significantly affected by ownership in our previous report (Constable et al. 2011) , this effect was non-significant in the present study. Acceleration during lift, however, mirrored our previous data well. We consistently observed greater acceleration being applied to the participant's own mug compared with the experimenter's or the unowned mug.
In sum, we have demonstrated the reliability of Constable et al. (2011, Experiment 1) methodological approach, replicated the findings, and demonstrated that although the location of the experimenter may have some influence on how people lift objects, it does not alter the effects of the main manipulation of interest: ownership status. Next, we further investigate these phenomena by modulating the social context in which the objects are presented.
Experiment 2
Experiment 1 suggests that knowledge of ownership status alters visuomotor processing during hand-object Error bars represent standard error of the mean for within-subject effects (Loftus and Masson 1994) interactions. Further, it seems that interactions with other people's property are somewhat restrained. Therefore, reducing the salience of a socially relevant relationship between an object and its owner may moderate the need to treat other's property any differently to one's own. Consequently, Experiment 2 was designed to assess whether the presence of an owner is necessary for ownership status to produce kinematic effects. As such, a confederate brought the 'other-owned' mug to the room, then left before the experiment began. If the effects rely entirely on the fact that the experimenter is the owner of the 'other-owned mug' and is present at the time, then the effects of ownership should be abolished. However, the effects will remain if they are based solely on knowledge about ownership status.
Method
Participants
Twenty-seven naive right-handed individuals took part in the experiment (mean age = 21.63 years, SD = 4.50 years; 6 were male) in exchange for either course credit or AU$30. Three participants' data were removed from the analysis because they indicated they were aware of the staged nature of the confederate scenario. One participant mug's design degraded due to aggressive washing, but we retained their data because they were able to identify the mug as their own.
Materials, apparatus, design, and procedure
These were identical to Experiment 1 except for the introduction of a confederate scenario at the beginning of the experimental session. Participants used their mug for an average of 13.63 days (SD = 3.43 days) and self-reported usage rates from 0.57 to 6.5 times per day (M = 1.56, SD = 1.30).
Each participant was seated in front of a table, while the experimenter began to attach markers to the mugs. She then pretended to look for her own mug and indicated to the participant that she could not find it but would call another laboratory member and ask to borrow theirs in order to complete the experiment. The confederate then came and gave the experimenter the same mug that was used as the 'Experimenter's Mug' in Experiment 1 and left. The experimenter finished attaching markers to the mugs and commenced the experiment. Although each participant was exposed to only one confederate, two were used during the study. A confederate was assigned on the basis of convenience. Both confederates were, like the experimenter, young female graduate researchers with dark hair, blue/ green eyes, of average height and similar names (Hayley and Harriet). The experiment then proceeded as usual with the experimenter positioned to the right of the participant.
Results
Trials with recording errors (1.23 %) were removed before analysis. We looked at the same measures reported in Experiment 1. On average, participants took 679 ms (SD = 136 ms) to initiate movement towards the mug after hearing the tone. The entire action took 2,085 ms (SD = 337 ms), with the mug in flight for 1,035 ms (SD = 221 ms). A Huynh-Feldt correction was applied to degrees of freedom where appropriate.
Spatial Manipulation
As before, 'Mug Type' had a significant effect on 'x at zmax', F(2,46) = 6.22, MSE = 6.09, p = .004, η 2 p = .213. The other-owned mug drifted significantly further to the right (11.9 mm) during lift compared to the participant's mug (9.7 mm, t(23) = 2.69, p = .01, d z = .55) and the unowned mug (9.7 mm, t(23) = 3.17, p = .004, d z = .65, see Fig. 2b ). The participant's mug and the unowned mug did not differ significantly, t(23) = .039, p = .97, d z = .01. 'Mug Type' had a significant effect on 'y at z-max', F(2,46) = 12.00, MSE = 6.40, p < .001, η 2 p = .343. As 
Dynamic manipulation
There was no effect of 'Mug Type' on 'Peak acceleration during lift', F(1.61, 36.91) = 1.3, MSE = 13275297, p = .28, η 2 p = .053 (see Fig. 3b ) or on deceleration, F(1.51,34.68) = 1.05, MSE = 10379,363, p = .34, η 2 p = .043.
Discussion
When we removed the owner of the 'other' object from the room during testing, the trajectory effects remained. We observed a greater rightward drift with the confederate's mug compared to the other mugs and participants drew their own mug closer towards themselves compared with the confederate's and the unowned mug. Consistent with Experiment 1, no effect on deceleration during placement was obtained. Contrary to Experiment 1, however, mug type did not have an effect on acceleration during lift. Given that an a priori power analysis on the basis of the effect size obtained by Constable et al. (2011) , d z = .86, revealed that a sample of 10 participants would be required to reach sufficient power at the recommended .80 level (Cohen 1988) , failure to obtain an acceleration effect here is unlikely to be the result of a small sample size. This suggests that the ownership effects previously associated with acceleration during lift are context dependent and may be dissociable from the trajectory measures being investigated. As we still obtain trajectory effects, it is not likely that a reduction in salience of the owner-object relationship is responsible for the lack of an effect on our acceleration measure. Perhaps, as previously suggested (Constable et al. 2011 ), differences in acceleration reflect different degrees of care taken. Therefore, this established boundary condition is more consistent with the idea that the observed differences are associated with a conflict prevention strategy aimed at developing, smoothing, and maintaining interpersonal relationships. A desire to take care of other people's property leads to less acceleration when interacting with the mug. If the owner is not present, however, this socially related goal is no longer salient and we observe no difference between the confederate's and the participant's mug in terms of acceleration. In the final experiment, we investigate whether the effects obtained in Experiment 1 are truly representative of ownership by focusing on the commonly confounded variable of preference.
Experiment 3
One fundamental difficulty while studying ownership is that ownership is often confounded with preference or choice. When we own an object, we also tend to evaluate it more favourably compared to other objects (Beggan 1992) . In order to determine whether a participant's knowledge of ownership status is associated with the embodiment of ownership rather than preference differences, we repeated the experiment but without an ownership component. Instead, participants chose a mug to use during the experiment and were not permitted to keep it. No mention of ownership was made to participants nor did they use the mug outside of the experimental task. Hence, preference and choice are still imbued in the mug, but ownership is absent. Upon completing the lifting task, participants indicated their degree of liking for the three mugs used during testing.
Method
Participants
Thirty-seven new right-handed individuals took part in the experiment (mean age = 19.46 years, SD = 2.04 years; 11 were male) in exchange for course credit.
Materials and apparatus
White ceramic mugs that were physically identical to those used in Experiments 1 and 2 were used. Eleven mugs painted by laboratory assistants were rated by 22 independent raters who were given a 7-point Likert scale and asked to rate how much they liked the mug, how masculine/feminine the design appeared, and also how much effort they felt had been given to the design. On the basis of these ratings, six mugs were selected as being the most neutral in terms of liking and effort. Of these six mugs, three fell on the masculine end of the scale and three fell on the feminine end of the scale ("Appendix" provides the ratings for each mug used). These six mugs plus a blank mug were used in the experiment (see Fig. 4 ).
Design and procedure
The design and procedure of the experimental session were identical to Experiments 1 and 2, except for how the mugs were selected. The six painted mugs were arranged pseudorandomly between participants in a row on the table. Participants were asked to 'choose a mug to use in the experiment today'. The experimenter then also chose a mug from the array, which was always one of two mugs (mug 4 or 5). The experimenter then said 'we will also use this blank mug for the experiment today' while presenting the blank mug to the participant. The experiment then proceeded as usual (see "Experiment 1") with the experimenter standing to the right of the participant and concluded with participants indicating which mug they and the experimenter had chosen and providing liking ratings on a 10-point scale. 
Results
One participant's data were removed before analysis due to a high number of recording errors (10 %). Other individual trials with recording errors (0.54 %) were removed before analysis. On average, participants took 662 ms (SD = 227 ms) to initiate movement towards the mug after hearing the tone. The entire action took 1,947 ms (SD = 458 ms), with the mug in flight for 951 ms (SD = 242 ms). All participants identified the mug they and the experimenter chose correctly. Huynh-Feldt corrections were applied where appropriate.
Mug ratings
There was a significant effect of mug on participant's ratings, F(1.78, 62.22) = 32.69, MSE = 3.13, p < .001, η 2 p = .48. The participant's chosen mug was rated higher (M = 7.03, SD = 1.34) than the experimenter's chosen mug (M = 6.39, SD = 1.50, t(35) = 2.14, p = .04, d z = .36) which was rated higher than the blank mug (M = 4.01, SD = 2.02, t(35) = 5.46, p < .001, d z = .91). This suggests that participant's did, indeed, have a preference for the mug they chose over the others they were lifting during the testing phase.
Spatial manipulation
Contrary to Experiments 1 and 2, no main effect of 'Mug Type' on 'x at z-max' was observed, F(2,70) = 1.553, MSE = 4.08, p = .219, η 2 p = .042. A trending effect of 'Mug Type' on 'y at z-max' was obtained, F(1.49,52.14) = 3.26, MSE = 11.45, p = .06, η 2 p = .085 (see Fig. 2c ). Planned comparisons revealed that the participant's chosen mug drifted towards the participant during lift (18.2 mm) significantly further than the experimenter's chosen mug (16.8 mm, t(35) 
Discussion
The findings from Experiments 1 and 2 may not have been purely due to the ownership status of the mugs, but contaminated by differential preferences we hold for objects that we own. To establish the extent to which mere choice (and thereby preference) influences the kinematics of mug lifts, we removed the ownership manipulation. A manipulation check confirmed that participants did like their chosen mug more than the other mugs they lifted during the experiment. Contrary to previous experiments, no differences in rightward drift were observed between the mugs. There was a significant difference associated with both acceleration during lift and deceleration during the placement of the mugs; however, this difference was due to the blank mug. The only effect obtained in previous experiments that remained was 'y at z-max', with participants drawing the mug they had chosen closer towards their body compared to the other mugs. Further, for measures on which we failed to replicate previously found effects (x at z-max, acceleration, and deceleration), we collected a sufficient sample size to detect effects of the same magnitude as those obtained by Constable et al. (2011) , d z s = .86-1.11 at the recommended .80 level (Cohen 1988) .
In Constable et al. (2011) , we suggested that the 'y at z-max' effect could be due to an over-learned 'drinking' motor response. This explanation, however, is not consistent with finding the same effect in response to a preference manipulation. Therefore, we suspect that this may be an approach response to objects we like, whether owned, or not. On the other hand, the effects obtained in Experiments 1 and 2 associated with 'x at z-max', and 'Peak acceleration during lift' seem to be independent from preference.
Given that the mere-ownership effect (Beggan 1992 ) produces greater liking associated with one's own things, it is possible that participants liked their own mug in Experiments 1 and 2 to a much greater extent than the preferred mug in Experiment 3 creating a smaller difference in preference between the mugs here. This may account for the lack of effects obtained in this experiment, but because we still obtain an effect in 'y at z-max', the absence of the other effects obtained in previous experiments is unlikely attributable to a lack of difference in preference.
General discussion
Over three experiments, we have replicated and extended the findings associated with ownership-related effects. These studies show that the previously described (Constable et al. 2011 ) kinematic effects pertaining to differences in ownership status are context dependent and dissociable from each other (see Table 1 ). Importantly, this is the first evidence directly implicating ownership as a variable that alters cognitive processing distinct from preference.
In general, measures of interest ('x at z-max', 'y at zmax', and 'Peak acceleration during lift') reflected the operation of distinct cognitive mechanisms. Given that 'x at z-max' was the only measure of interest exclusively linked with ownership in the experiments presented here, and previous research (see Constable et al. 2011) , we suggest that it is a valid and robust representation of embodiment of the social construct of ownership. 'Y at z-max' was the only measure that consistently produced the same pattern of results throughout the three experiments, one of which did not involve ownership. As such, it is difficult to make an argument that the inducement of ownership is required to elicit effects associated with a drift towards the participant. Regarding acceleration, however, differences between the mugs were absent when the owner of the object was absent. As we failed to replicate the previously reported (Constable et al. 2011 ) pattern of results associated with deceleration, we interpret the acceleration data with caution. It may suggest that when participants were in the presence of the owner in Experiment 1, they were taking extra care with the experimenter's mug, perhaps as a conflict prevention strategy.
Rightward drift during lift
Looking at 'x at z-max' more closely, in Experiment 1, we addressed the alternative hypothesis that mugs drift towards their owner during lift. The experimenter's mug drifted further towards the right as compared to both the participant's mug and the unowned mug. The location of the experimenter, however, did not interact with mug type. The most parsimonious explanation of the data, therefore, is that the effect represents a general reticence to interact with other people's property rather than the participant moving the owned object towards its owner.
The same pattern of results for 'x at z-max' was observed when the owner of the 'other-owned' object was absent (Experiment 2). Therefore, this measure is robust to socially related environmental changes. This indicates that the social construct of ownership is embodied within the motor system and prompts automatic motor processing even in the absence of a visible need to account for other people's property. The pattern of results in Experiment 2 provides further evidence disqualifying the idea that the mugs travel towards their owner during lift as the owner was not present. We propose instead that this pattern of movement is a result of a general avoidance process. Overall, the pattern of results associated with this measure provides a strong case for the notion that ownership alters visuomotor processing beyond a conscious goal of developing, smoothing, and maintaining interpersonal relationships, reflecting automatic approach and avoidance processes.
Proximity to the body during lift
Across all three experiments, the participant's own (Experiments 1 and 2) or chosen (Experiment 3) mug drifted further towards the participant's body during lift compared Constable et al. (2011) with the other (experimenter's, confederate's, or experimenters chosen) mug or the blank mug. Constable et al. (2011) previously suggested that this may be associated with an over-learned motor process. The fact that the same pattern of results emerged when participants have had no prior exposure to the mugs and there is no difference in familiarity between the three mugs they lift (Experiment 3) suggests that this is not the case. Rather, it is consistent with a preference for, or a positive connotation associated with, the participant's own or chosen mug as compared with the others. This explanation concurs with previous research on the approach/avoidance effect (Chen and Bargh 1999; Lugli et al. 2012; Markman and Brendl 2005; van Dantzig et al. 2008) showing that positive words or positively connoted objects elicit faster response times when the action involves pulling a lever or mouse towards the body, while negative words or negatively connoted objects elicit a faster response time when the action involves pushing the lever or mouse away. The attribution of ownership (Experiments 1 and 2) and the act of choosing an object (Experiment 3) may construe otherwise neutral objects as being positive and favourable (as in the mere-ownership effect, Beggan 1992) via a common mechanism that is special neither to ownership or choice.
Acceleration associated with lifting actions
In Experiment 1, participants reached higher peak acceleration during the lift phase of the movement with their own mug compared with the experimenter's mug and the unowned mug. No difference was observed, however, when the owner of the other object was absent from the room during testing. Therefore, the differences observed in Experiment 1 may reflect a desire to be seen to take care of other people's things or a means to maintain social connections by avoiding conflicts only when those individuals are present. There was a significant difference observed in Experiment 3, but this difference was associated with the blank mug reaching a lower peak acceleration rather than any difference between chosen mugs. The larger overall acceleration observed in Experiment 3 is surprising. However, it is possible that this is due to the fact that ownership as a construct is absent in this Experiment. We have previously indicated that acceleration may be indicative of a level of care associated with the mugs. It is likely that participants want to care for their own mug, and perhaps the other person's mug to an even greater extent (as indicated in Experiment 1). When the construct of ownership is removed, the social and personal cost of damaging the mugs is a lot less salient in the overall experimental context for these participants, which could lead to greater acceleration overall.
Familiarity versus ownership
There are many variables that are typically present and contribute to the cognitive representation of ownership. For example, familiarity is often an aspect of ownership. Is it possible that the 'ownership' effects we observe in the presented experiments are merely attributable to differences in familiarity? Although we do not directly test this, our pattern of results suggests that the cognitive representation of ownership elicits effects that cannot be attributable solely to familiarity. First, our 'ownership'-related measures seem to be associated with interacting with other people's things rather than one's own things. In these experiments, participants had identical levels of familiarity with the 'other-owned' mug and the 'unowned' mug and despite this differences were still observed. Second, it is possible that the higher peak acceleration associated with the owned mug in Experiment 1 could be attributed to a greater familiarity with one's own mug, that is, we are more confident in interacting with our own things. However, this would predict that the acceleration effect would remain in Experiment 2 as the participants had the same level of familiarity with each mug across both experiments. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the differences in ownership are merely a reflection of differing levels of familiarity.
How familiarity interacts with ownership still poses interesting questions for future research. For example, is temporary ownership or instant ownership represented in the same way or in a cognitively distinct manner as longterm ownership? Do ownership-related effects change over time as one becomes more familiar with the object? Does your understanding of another person's level of familiarity with their own object have subsequent effects on your behaviour with regards to that object?
Beyond the question on familiarity, there are ample opportunities for future research involving ownership and action. For example, factors such as the fragility of an object alter the way in which we interact with it (Savelsbergh et al. 1996) but can ownership alter the way in which we perceive fragility and subsequently is this change observed in our actions? Perhaps, context plays a role in how these ownership effects are modulated. Our intention to cooperate with the other individual, how much we like them, and how comfortable we would be to actually touch or drink from a mug owned by a particular individual are all factors that may interact with ownership at the level of hand-object interactions.
As acknowledged by James (1890) , distinguishing between 'me' and 'mine' is not trivial. Given the importance of possessions to our sense of self, it is not surprising that we are acutely aware of our own property (Belk 1988) . But the data presented here also demonstrate that we implicitly account for other people's property and this process is reflected in the way we act upon objects in our immediate surroundings. The attribution of meaning to owned objects alters our behaviours in a subtle and contextually driven way. Indeed, future research may find that these ownership-related effects are further modulated by other factors such as the fragility of the object or the context of the interaction (for example, are we cooperating with the other individual, do we like the other individual, are we comfortable drinking from a mug owned by the other individual?) More specifically, the data provide a strong case for the inhibition of action towards other people's property. We also demonstrate that preference cannot account for these ownership-related effects. Moreover, ownership independently contributes to differences in individual's motoric interactions with objects. The methodological approach presented here may also provide a new means of investigating the developmental trajectory of ownership cognition and how this alters an individual's perception of and interactions with important socially relevant objects. Table 2 Mean ratings (liking, masculinity/femininity, effort) of the six painted mugs used in Experiment 3 provided by 22 independent raters Liking and masculinity/femininity were both rated on a nine point Likert Scale. 1 = Strongly dislike or Highly Masculine, 9 = Strongly like or Highly Feminine. Effort was rated in terms of 1 = No effort invested, 2 = Not much effort was invested, 3 = A moderate amount of effort was invested, 4 = A large amount of effort was invested 
